The main aim of this article is to reflect on the impact of biases related to artificial intelligence (AI) systems developed to tackle issues arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, with special focus on those developed for triage and risk prediction. A secondary aim is to review assessment tools that have been developed to prevent biases in AI systems. In addition, we provide a conceptual clarification for some terms related to biases in this particular context. We focus mainly on nonracial biases (...) that may be less considered when addressing biases in AI systems in the existing literature. In the manuscript, we found that the existence of bias in AI systems used for COVID-19 can result in algorithmic justice and that the legal frameworks and strategies developed to prevent the apparition of bias have failed to adequately consider social determinants of health. Finally, we make some recommendations on how to include more diverse professional profiles in order to develop AI systems that increase the epistemic diversity needed to tackle AI biases during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond. (shrink)

En este trabajo argumento contra la explicación de la semántica y la pragmática de las adscripciones de actitudes proposicionales que Soames ofrece en Beyond Rigidity. Defiendo una restricción para la identificación del contenido semántico de las frases de un lenguaje basada en las condiciones de competencia semántica, y argumento que la falla de sustitutividad es un componente esencial de nuestras condiciones de competencia en los predicados de actitudes proposicionales. Dado que la explicación de Soames no respeta esta condición, concluyo que (...) no es una explicación adecuada de las adscripciones de actitudes proposicionales. (shrink)

Dialogamos con Cintia Rodríguez Garat, quien obtuvo el Primer Premio Bioética 2023 de la Fundación Jaime Roca por su trabajo “Resiliencia y salud pública de las mujeres mapuce ante el cambio climático. Un análisis desde una perspectiva intercultural, participativa y de derechos humanos”.

In this paper I argue that, in order to make (T1) and (T2) compatible within a Fregean approach, we must reject the view that all modes of presentation are senses. (T1) There is a diversity of ways in which Venus may be presented to each subject, and which are associated with the name ‘Venus’. (T2) There is only one Fregean thought expressed by the sentence ‘Venus is a planet’. Modes of presentation are essentially psychological and have causal powers on minds. (...) The mind of a subject is sensitive to differences in modes of presentation, so that if an object is presented to a subject under different modes of presentation and she has no reason to believe that they are modes of presentation of one and the same object, then she may take opposing attitudes involving those different modes of presentation. In contrast, senses are essentially semantic. For this reason, I propose that they be understood as certain ways of determining the reference of terms, and either are given by the semantic rules for those terms or are identical to those semantic rules. I agree with McDowell that an interpretive truth-theory for a language L gives us a theory of sense for L, and that something like (V) ‘Venus’ refers to Venus will give us the axiom which assigns the semantic value for ‘Venus’ within such a theory, and which is necessary in order to derive the interpretive truth-conditions of a sentence like ‘Venus is a planet’. An axiom like ‘Venus’ refers to Hesperus will not do within a theory of sense. Nonetheless, it will do within a theory of reference, a truth-theory which delivers not interpretive truth-conditions, but purely referential truth conditions. The purely referential truth-conditions for an indicative atomic sentence are, I claim, those which are specified by specifying those features in the world (objects, properties, etc.) to which the meaningful parts of the sentence refer, representing them as related in a certain way. For the specification of such truth-conditions, the difference in cognitive value between two sentences will not matter, whereas it will matter for the specification of interpretive truth-conditions. Now, senses are introduced to allow for an explanation of the difference in cognitive value between sentences with the same purely referential truth-conditions. An indication of when two sentences differ in cognitive value is when it is possible for a subject who is rational and understands the language in question to take opposing attitudes to those sentences (or their contents —whatever those contents are); and if there is in fact such a subject who takes opposing attitudes to those sentences, then those sentences differ in their cognitive value. Given this connection between cognitive value and a subject’s attitudes, and given the purpose for which senses are introduced, we must suppose that a subject’s mind must be sensitive to differences in senses, and so, that senses must be psychologically relevant. My proposal, which aims to establish some kind of identity between some modes of presentation under certain conditions and those ways of determination which are senses, is as follows: A psychological mode of presentation M is a way of determination which is a sense relative to a particular expression e in a public language L which aids in expressing propositional attitude P if and only if i the subject who has M and who is sufficiently competent in L knows (or realizes) that M goes with e in L; ii no other proposition e′ in L is more adequate for reporting the subject’s propositional attitude P; iii M is crucial in the subject’s rational failure to make certain identifications; and iv M is an appropriate function to an appropriate reference. Only the mode of presentation associated with ‘Venus’ that satisfies conditions i-iv relative to ‘Venus’ which aids in expressing a propositional attitude like the belief that Venus is a planet, will be the sense of ‘Venus’. I argue that only the mode of presentation of Venus as Venus will do, and that such mode of presentation is implicit in the way of determination shown by (V). Other modes of presentation of Venus as being big or appearing in the sky in the evenings or being the second planet in proximity to the sun will not satisfy conditions i–iv. Thus, although a subject may have all these modes of presentation of Venus and associate them with ‘Venus’ (i.e. (T1)), only the mode of presentation of Venus as Venus will do as the sense of ‘Venus’. Hence, only one thought will be expressed by a sentence like ‘Venus is a planet’ (i.e. (T2)). (shrink)

Consider a certain red rose. The proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red. One might say as well that the proposition that the rose is red is made true by the rose’s being red. This, it has been thought, does not commit one to a truthmaker of the proposition that the rose is red. For there is no entity that makes the proposition true. What makes it true is how the rose is, and how (...) the rose is is not an entity over and above the rose. It is against this view that I shall argue in this paper. I shall argue that a significant class of true propositions, including inessential predications like the proposition that the rose is red, are made true by entities. "No truthmaking without truthmakers" is my slogan. Although I have my view about what kinds of entities are truthmakers, I shall not argue for or presuppose that view here. All I shall argue for here is that if a proposition is made true by something, it is made true by some thing, but my argument will leave it open what kind of thing that thing is: it could be a fact or state of affairs, a trope, or any other sort of entity. (shrink)

This bulletin contains a summary of the main topics of discussion in truthmaker theory, namely: the definition of truthmakers, problems with Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Truthmaker Maximalism, the ontological burden of truthmakers and the recalcitrant topic of truthmakers for negative truths.

1. The Bundle Theory I shall discuss is a theory about the nature of substances or concrete particulars, like apples, chairs, atoms, stars and people. The point of the Bundle Theory is to avoid undesirable entities like substrata that allegedly constitute particulars. The version of the Bundle Theory I shall discuss takes particulars to be entirely constituted by the universals they instantiate.' Thus particulars are said to be just bundles of universals. Together with the claim that it is necessary that (...) particulars have constituents, the fundamental claim of the Bundle Theory is: (BT) Necessarily, for every particular x and every entity y, y constitutes x if and only ify is a universal and x instantiates y. 2 The standard and supposedly devastating objection to the Bundle Theory is that it entails or is committed to a false version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (Armstrong 1978: 91, Loux 1998: 107), namely: (Pll) Necessarily, for all particulars x and y and every universal z, if z is instantiated by x if and only if z is instantiated byy, then x is numerically identical with y. The most famous counterexample to the Identity of Indiscernibles is that put forward by Max Black, consisting of a world where there are only two iron spheres two miles apart from each other, having the same diameter, temperature, colour, shape, size, etc (Black 1952: 156). Let us from now on think of the properties of the spheres in this world as universals. The possibility of this world, which I shall hereafter refer to as 'Black's world', makes (Pll) false.' And according to common philosophical opinion this means that the Bundle Theory is false.. (shrink)

Peter Milne has tried to refure Truthmaker Maximalism. the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker, by producing a simple and direct counterexample to it, the sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. I argue that, contrary to what Milne argues, on Truthmaker Maximalism M is equivalent to the Liar, which gives the truthmaker maximalist a way to defend his position from Milne's counterexample: to argue that M expresses no proposition.

This paper is a response to replies by Dan López de Sa and Mark Jago to my ‘Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjuction Thesis’. In that paper, my main aim was to argue against the Entailment Principle by arguing against the Conjunction Thesis, which is entailed by the Entailment Principle. In the course of so doing, although not essential for my project in that paper, I defended the Disjunction Thesis. López de Sa has objected both to my defence of the Disjunction (...) Thesis and my case against the Conjunction Thesis. I shall show that his objections are unfounded and based on serious misunderstandings of my position, what the relevant debate is, and some fundamental notions of Truthmaker Theory. Jago argues that accepting the Disjunction Thesis and rejecting the Conjunction Thesis is hard to maintain. But I show that Jago has not shown that accepting the Disjunction Thesis while rejecting the Conjunction Thesis is impossible or even hard to maintain. Jago believes that, to accept the Disjunction Thesis while rejecting the Conjunction Thesis, one needs to reject his axiom (T3), which says that all the truthmakers for <P&P> are truthmakers for <P>. I argue that there are reasons to reject such a principle, and the version of it that says that what makes <P&P> true makes <P> true. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es realizar una historización del sistema sanitario de Neuquén, concretamente atendiendo a los programas de salud aplicados en esta provincia desde su surgimiento hasta el año 2020. En este marco, en primer lugar, me enfocaré en los lineamientos políticos que definieron las bases ideológicas de las políticas públicas llevadas a cabo en la atención sanitaria neuquina, y, en segundo lugar, examinaré las variables estadísticas publicadas por el sistema de salud provincial referidas a las condiciones materiales (...) de atención médica de la población en general, y de las mujeres indígenas mapuce en particular. Para efectuar dicho abordaje, analizaré específicamente la localidad de Las Coloradas. -/- . (shrink)

Nuestro objetivo consiste en caracterizar la ontología corporal de las mujeres indígenas mapuce desde el esquema epistemológico sujeto-sujeto, propio de las teorías decoloniales. En este aspecto, nos interesa desnaturalizar ciertos mecanismos de subalternización, en tanto huellas de la colonialidad, que siguen operando no solo en la construcción de sentidos, sino también como reproductores de la opresión interseccional que experimentan estas mujeres. Preliminarmente, para este planteo, nos enfocaremos en la delimitación del concepto de interseccionalidad. Luego, intentaremos articular, desde un planteo feminista (...) decolonial, diversas narrativas de estas mujeres mapuce, vinculadas a la precarización de sus vidas y su salud, como parte de las violencias instituidas por la cultura hegemónica. Finalmente, nos resulta fundamental poner de relieve la resiliencia de las culturas subalternizadas, como forma horizontalizada de narrativizar un sentir decolonial desde la memoria performativa del cuerpo, contra ciertos dispositivos de subalternización, a partir de la clara referencia a las luchas y re-existencias de las mujeres indígenas mapuce, en el marco de una perspectiva situada en la decolonización, la emancipación y la liberación de los pueblos oprimidos. (shrink)

According to one of Leibniz's theories of contingency a proposition is contingent if and only if it cannot be proved in a finite number of steps. It has been argued that this faces the Problem of Lucky Proof , namely that we could begin by analysing the concept ‘Peter’ by saying that ‘Peter is a denier of Christ and …’, thereby having proved the proposition ‘Peter denies Christ’ in a finite number of steps. It also faces a more general but (...) related problem that we dub the Problem of Guaranteed Proof . We argue that Leibniz has an answer to these problems since for him one has not proved that ‘Peter denies Christ’ unless one has also proved that ‘Peter’ is a consistent concept, an impossible task since it requires the full decomposition of the infinite concept ‘Peter’. We defend this view from objections found in the literature and maintain that for Leibniz all truths about created individual beings are contingent. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se abordarán los aportes realizados por Gramsci en la construcción de la figura del intelectual. Para ello, se caracterizarán los rasgos distintivos del determinismo histórico marxista, para luego enfocarnos en el pensamiento gramsciano. A partir de allí nos centraremos de manera expresa en los argumentos desplegados por Gramsci al procurarle una función activa a la figura del intelectual, en tanto intelectual colectivo que se va conformando encarnado en el partido revolucionario de la clase obrera. De esta (...) manera, plantearemos que esta disposición del intelectual colectivo se enlaza con los problemas de la vida social en la búsqueda de unificar teoría y praxis, y pretende crear así una nueva hegemonía, puesto que admite la indeterminabilidad de la historia según leyes. (shrink)

Interpretando a Nietzsche, podríamos afirmar que la embriaguez dionisíaca le posibilita al humano dirigirse afectivamente hacia lo externo, borrando incluso y paradójicamente ese límite que determinaría dónde empieza su ser y dónde aquello a lo que su ser es empujado. Trías recoge esta determinación en un concepto clave de su filosofía al denominarnos “ser del límite”. En ambos filósofos somos radicalmente pasión creadora; somos un animal límite y caótico, sufriente por queriente, y potencialmente feliz por el mismo motivo. Está en (...) nuestras manos investigar, tras el reconocimiento de esta condición estética, sensible e insalvable de lo humano, cómo vivir. (shrink)

In this chapter I shall reply to a pair of articles in which the main contention of my “Why truthmakers” – namely, that an important class of synthetic true propositions have entities as truth-makers – is rejected. In §§1–5 I reply to Jennifer Hornsby’s “Truth without Truthmaking Entities” (2005) and in §§6–7 I reply to Julian Dodd’s “Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles” (2007).

Bertrand Russell argued that any attempt to get rid of universals in favor of resemblances fails. He argued that no resemblance theory could avoid postulating a universal of resemblance without falling prey to a vicious infinite regress. He added that admitting such a universal of resemblance made it pointless to avoid other universals. In this paper I defend resemblance nominalism from both of Russell's points by arguing that (a) resemblance nominalism can avoid the postulation of a universal of resemblance without (...) falling into a vicious infinite regress, and (b) even if resemblance nominalism had to admit a universal of resemblance, this would not make it pointless to avoid postulating other universals. (shrink)

The paper argues that grounding is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive. In arguing for that conclusion the paper also arguesthat truthmaking is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive.

In my book *Resemblance Nominalism* I argued that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In his "Resemblance Nominalism and counterparts" Alexander Bird objects to my claim that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In this paper I respond to Bird´s objections.

At a crucial juncture in Plato’s Sophist, when the interlocutors have reached their deepest confusion about being and not-being, the Eleatic Visitor proclaims that there is yet hope. Insofar as they clarify one, he maintains, they will equally clarify the other. But what justifies the Visitor’s seemingly oracular prediction? A new interpretation explains how the Visitor’s hope is in fact warranted by the peculiar aporia they find themselves in. The passage describes a broader pattern of ‘exploring both sides’ that lends (...) insight into Plato’s aporetic method. (shrink)

In his discussion of our idea of time in the Treatise, Hume makes the perplexing claim that unchanging objects cannot be said to endure. While Hume is targeting the Newtonian conception of absolute time, it is not at all clear how his denial that unchanging objects are in time fits with this target. Moreover, Hume diagnoses our belief that unchanging objects endure as the product of a psychological fiction, but his account of this fiction is also riddled with puzzling claims (...) about our experience of unchanging objects. In this paper, we argue that Hume’s claims are a lot less baffling and indeed, much more sophisticated than they appear. We do so by considering his arguments as a response to Locke’s specific approach to the concept of absolute time. (shrink)

This article will address the considerations that must be examined in the design of public policies and government programs to achieve an intercultural approach to the health of the Pu Mapuce Zomo (Mapuce women). In this sense, the proposed objective is to formulate three essential aspects that serve as a basis to promote adequate frameworks for public health policies oriented towards an intercultural approach. For this, methodologically, from a qualitative approach, the ethical, gender(s) and epistemic aspects that must be considered (...) in the configuration of health programs that favor the health care of indigenous women will be investigated. With this purpose, it begins by delimiting the unavoidable ethical-normative and gender approach to highlight the basic needs of Mapuce women. This approach seeks to establish a parameter about the obligations that States have in relation to the development of human capabilities. Finally, three aspects will be presented that the State must replicate in its health proposals to guarantee the construction of an intercultural approach to health, appropriate to the basic needs of Mapuce women in Argentina. (shrink)

Con el objetivo de reflexionar sobre la potencialidad filosófica y política que tienen los afectos “negativos”, me interesa repensar el rol social de estos afectos a partir de abordar los efectos, en términos de agencialidad, que pueden propiciar en el ámbito político. Para ello, comenzaré con una breve caracterización sobre las implicancias del concepto de “olas” del feminismo, para entender a grandes rasgos los cambios históricos conquistados por las luchas feministas y los activismos. En este sentido, me situaré en la (...) “cuarta ola” del feminismo para abordar las nociones vinculadas al giro afectivo, a partir del fuerte cuestionamiento que esta matriz teórica le realiza a la noción de temporalidad lineal. Finalmente, analizaré la potencialidad que portan los afectos “negativos” en la escena política, a partir de resaltar el fuerte tono revolucionario que estas emociones, en tanto expresiones de la visceralidad, pueden tener en la transformación de la sociedad cuando irrumpen en el orden público. (shrink)

Este trabajo se propone documentar y reflexionar sobre la utilización de herramientas pedagógico-didácticas en tiempos de SAR-COV-2 desde el espacio de la Práctica Docente de los Institutos de Formación Docente del Distrito 040-General Madariaga, provincia de Buenos Aires (ISFD N°169; ISFDyT N°59). Motiva la investigación que existen pocos trabajos empíricos que documenten las experiencias de la práctica docente en esta zona y en este contexto sanitario. Desde una perspectiva crítica se dará cuenta de las concepciones, utilización de herramientas y estrategias (...) que se ponen en juego desde las prácticas y residencia de los Profesorados de Inicial y Primaria, durante la pandemia mencionada. Se trata de una investigación cualitativa, exploratoria. Como resultados principales se abordarán la resignificación de distintas herramientas pedagógico-didácticas, como las videollamadas; la organización de contenidos mediante Classroom, Plataformas digitales y el dictado de clases por canales de YouTube. La finalidad es subrayar como común denominador la búsqueda de alternativas de interacción gratuitas, por parte de las docentes que, en casi la totalidad de los casos, tuvieron que garantizar la continuidad pedagógica mediante la propia construcción de dichos canales de comunicación. (shrink)

how does one inquire into the truth of first principles? Where does one begin when deciding where to begin? Aristotle recognizes a series of difficulties when it comes to understanding the starting points of a scientific or philosophical system, and contemporary scholars have encountered their own difficulties in understanding his response. I will argue that Aristotle was aware of a Platonic solution that can help us uncover his own attitude toward the problem.Aristotle's central problem with first principles arises from the (...) fact that they cannot be demonstrated in the same way as other propositions. Since demonstrations proceed from prior and better-known principles, if the principles themselves were in need of... (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Ancient Greek Sceptics implicitly presupposed a Parmenidean ontology.

The concern of this paper is a version of Resemblance Nominalism according to which resemblance classes, i.e. classes of resembling things, are determined by paradigms. I show that the theory is false, since paradigms do not generally determine resemblance classes. Although I concentrate upon the version of the theory which was delineated by H. H. Price, my results apply to any other theory constructing resemblance classes out of paradigms.

The paper clarifies the sense of remark 202 of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* with respect to its relation to the private language argument. It argues, against what some have maintained, that remark 202 is not meant to reject the possibility of a private language as this is defined in remark 243.

Background Consent policies for post-mortem organ procurement (OP) vary throughout Europe, and yet no studies have empirically evaluated the ethical implications of contrasting consent models. To fill this gap, we introduce a novel indicator of governance quality based on the ideal of informed support, and examine national differences on this measure through a quantitative survey of OP policy informedness and preferences in seven European countries. -/- Methods Between 2017–2019, we conducted a convenience sample survey of students (n = 2006) in (...) Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Slovenia (SI) and Spain (ES), asking participants about their donation preferences, as well as their beliefs and views about the policy in place. From these measures, we computed indices of informedness, policy support, and fulfilment of unexpressed preferences, which we compared across countries and consent systems. -/- Results Our study introduces a tool for analyzing policy governance in the context of OP. Wide variation in policy awareness was observed: Most respondents in DK, DE, AT and BE correctly identified the policy in place, while those in SI, GR and ES did not. Respondents in opt-out countries (AT, BE, ES and GR) tended to support the policy in place (with one exception, i.e., SI), whereas those in opt-in countries (DE and DK) overwhelmingly opposed it. These results reveal stark differences in governance quality across countries and consent policies: We found a preponderance of informed opposition in opt-in countries and a general tendency towards support–either informed or uninformed–in opt-out countries. We also found informed divergence in opt-in countries and a tendency for convergence–either informed or uninformed–among opt-out countries. -/- Conclusion Our study offers a novel tool for analyzing governance quality and illustrates, in the context of OP, how the strengths and weaknesses of different policy implementations can be estimated and compared using quantitative survey data. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to provide a solution to Nelson Goodman’s Imperfect Community difficulty as it arises for Resemblance Nominalism, the view that properties are classes of resembling particulars. The Imperfect Community difficulty consists in that every two members of a class resembling each other is not sufficient for it to be a class such that there is some property common to all their members, even if ‘x resembles y’ is understood as ‘x and y share some property’. (...) In the paper I explain and criticise several solutions to the difficulty. Then I develop my own solution, which is not subject to the objections I make to the other solutions, and which accords completely with the basic tenets of Resemblance Nominalism. (shrink)

The goal of this piece is to put some pressure on Brian O’Shaughnessy’s claim that perceptual experiences are necessarily mental processes. The author targets two motivations behind the development of that view. First, O’Shaughnessy resorts to pure conceptual analysis to argue that perceptual experiences are processes. The author argues that this line of reasoning is inconclusive. Secondly, he repeatedly invokes a thought experiment concerning the total freeze of a subject’s experiential life. Even if this case is coherent, however, it does (...) not show that perceptual experiences are processes. (shrink)

Aunque la problemática de los daños ambientales ha atraído el interés sustancial de profesionales y académicos de diversas disciplinas, los motivos que impulsan esas prácticas han recibido poca atención en la literatura jurídica colombiana. Especialmente desde la perspectiva de la responsabilidad. Este capítulo presenta unas reflexiones preliminares de la responsabilidad por daños ambientales, para introducir el estudio de diversos temas, hacia una construcción doctrinal enmarcada no sólo en el deber de evitar el progresivo deterioro ambiental causado por el hombre, sino (...) para salvaguardar las especies vivas que habitan y habitarán este planeta, así como el legado que le quedará a las generaciones venideras. (shrink)

Leibniz’s short letter to the mathematician and physicist Ludovico Casati of 1689 is a short but interesting text on the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, to which it is entirely dedicated. Since there is no watermark in the paper of the letter, the letter is difficult to date, but it is likely that it was written during Leibniz’s stay in Rome, sometime between April and November of 1689 (A 2 2 287–8). When addressing the letter, Leibniz wrote ‘Casani’, but this (...) seems to be a mistake and the real addressee is thought to be Ludovico Casati, nephew of Paolo Casati, the Jesuit mathematician. The letter, reproduced in the Berlin’s Academy edition of Leibniz’s works, was first published by Gerhardt in the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie in 1892 (Gerhardt 1892: 53–54). It also appears in Robinet’s Iter Italicum (Robinet 1988: 134–35). But neither Gerhardt nor Robinet provide a philosophical discussion of the letter, and I am not aware of any other philosophical discussion of it. Furthermore, as far as I know, the letter has never been translated into any language. Thus I shall here provide a transcription (from A 2 2 288–89) and a translation of the letter into English, and a philosophical discussion of its treatment of the Identity of Indiscernibles. (shrink)

En este ensayo nos proponemos realizar algunas consideraciones argumentativas breves sobre la ética en investigaciones con seres humanos vulnerables. Para ello, examinaremos el conocido caso de Tuskegee (Alabama), ocurrido entre los años 1932-1972, en el que 600 personas afroamericanas fueron inoculadas con sífilis sin su consentimiento. Luego, desde una postura crítica, abordaremos el caso desde tres perspectivas bioéticas. En primer lugar, lo analizaremos desde el plano jurídico-normativo, luego desde el principialismo formulado por Tom Beauchamp y James Childress, y finalmente, desde (...) el enfoque conceptual de la “vulnerabilidad”, referido a las poblaciones participantes en las investigaciones bioéticas. En efecto, nos centraremos en los miramientos que estos enfoques plantean de forma expresa, para realizar un análisis reflexivo sobre el necesario aspecto ético, requerido en el seno de toda investigación bioética con personas vulnerables. (shrink)

Causation was an important topic of philosophical reflection during the Seventeenth Century. This reflection centred around certain particular problems about causation, one of which was the problem of causation between mind and body. The doctrine of the pre-established harmony is Leibniz's response to the problem of causation between mind and body. In this chapter I shall (a) explain the problem of mind-body causation; (b) explain Leibniz's pre-established harmony; and (c) assess his case for it.

Todas las prácticas ancestrales relacionadas con el parto y la maternidad tienen para las comunidades mapuce un profundo anclaje cultural. ¿Qué sucede cuando la mujer mapuce va a parir a un hospital público del sistema de salud hegemónico? ¿Se respeta su cosmovisión? ¿Se valoran sus saberes? ¿Se la escucha? En este libro, Cintia Rodríguez Garat aborda la atención sanitaria de parto de las mujeres mapuce en la localidad de Las Coloradas, provincia del Neuquén, y se pregunta si en esta (...) práctica prevalece el respeto a sus derechos culturales. Esta es la puerta de entrada a un profundo análisis de la situación de opresión interseccional que han padecido históricamente las mujeres mapuce, producto de múltiples discriminaciones, con eje en las relaciones de género, clase y etnia. -/- El estudio busca justificar la implementación de políticas públicas, basadas en una concepción de justicia epistémica, para promover en Neuquén y en el resto del país el derecho a la salud desde la pluralidad histórica de la diversidad cultural y con perspectiva de género. (shrink)

Peter van Inwagen has given an answer to the question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’. His answer is: Because there being nothing is as improbable as anything can be: it has probability 0. Here I shall examine his argument for this answer and I shall argue that it does not work because no good reasons have been given for two of the argument’s premises and that the conclusion of the argument does not constitute an answer to the question (...) van Inwagen wanted to answer. (shrink)

Plato’s Parmenides and Lysis have a surprising amount in common from a methodological standpoint. Both systematically employ a method that I call ‘exploring both sides’, a philosophical method for encouraging further inquiry and comprehensively understanding the truth. Both have also been held in suspicion by interpreters for containing what looks uncomfortably similar to sophistic methodology. I argue that the methodological connections across these and other dialogues relieve those suspicions and push back against a standard developmentalist story about Plato’s method. This (...) allows for a better understanding of why exploring both sides is explicitly recommended in the Parmenides and its role within Plato’s broader methodological repertoire. (shrink)

Resemblance Nominalism is the view that denies universals and tropes and claims that what makes F-things F is their resemblances. A famous argument against Resemblance Nominalism is Russell's regress of resemblances, according to which the resemblance nominalist falls into a vicious infinite regress. Aristocratic Resemblance Nominalism, as opposed to Egalitarian Resemblance Nominalism, is the version of Resemblance Nominalism that claims that what makes F-things F is that they resemble the F-paradigms. In this paper I attempt to show that a recently (...) advocated strategy to stop Russell's regress by using paradigms does not succeed. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se abordarán los aportes de Nietzsche, Freud y Marx, como fundadores de discurso, desde la perspectiva foucaultiana. Para ello, se trabajará con la ponencia "Nietzsche, Freud y Marx" realizada por Foucault en 1964. Foucault condensa en esta ponencia una obra que resulta muy rica, debido a que sintetiza de manera clara los aportes realizados por los "maestros de la sospecha". La riqueza de la obra radica en que expone un giro en las técnicas de la interpretación (...) que permite comprender a la hermenéutica, lejos del descifrado oculto de signos, como una estrategia de producción de nuevos símbolos, en la creación de nuevos imaginarios que construyen diversos y variados sentidos (Grüner, 1995: 11). De esta manera, en el presente escrito se planteará un acercamiento al empleo de las técnicas interpretativas que han llevado a cabo Nietzsche, Freud y Marx, como una forma de acceder a la hermenéutica de la sospecha propuesta por este trío. Para el desarrollo de esta propuesta partiremos de la caracterización general de los tres fundadores de discurso, para puntualizar en la impronta propia de la hermenéutica de cada uno. (shrink)

En este artículo se plantean las bases del marco ético-normativo que intervienen en la atención sanitaria de las mujeres en general, y de las mujeres mapuce, en particular. Posteriormente, se realiza un abordaje de las mujeres indígenas analizando su situación concreta, a partir de considerar de manera crítica la confluencia intersectorial de distintos sistemas opresivos que articulan las relaciones de género, clase y etnia. Para ello, el planteo se centrará en el estudio de esta problemática desde la perspectiva feminista latinoamericana, (...) que será, seguidamente, retomada y contrastada desde la voz propia de mujeres que se autoidentifican como mapuce. El objetivo del artículo se centra en poner de manifiesto las múltiples dificultades que presentan las mujeres indígenas en el acceso a la salud, con el propósito de justificar la necesidad de articular políticas públicas que promuevan la democratización del acceso sanitario, en tanto derecho humano. Para ello, realizaremos un abordaje teórico-normativo que ponga en evidencia las responsabilidades éticas y políticas del Estado, como ente garante del acceso a la salud de sus ciudadanos, en particular de los más vulnerados, como lo son las mujeres de comunidades indígenas en nuestro país. (shrink)

En el presente artículo abordaremos el marco político y jurídico de la atención sanitaria intercultural de mujeres indígenas en Argentina, en particular, en la provincia de Neuquén. El objetivo es realizar una revisión sistemática del marco jurídico normativo producido en los distintos programas sanitarios que propician la atención de salud con un enfoque intercultural, centrada concretamente en las mujeres mapuce de Neuquén. Finalmente, nos enfocaremos en la contradicción que se produce cuando, por un lado, se defiende un enfoque sanitario intercultural (...) desde los marcos político-discursivo y jurídico, y, por el otro, se aplica un modelo sanitario biomédico, con tintes patriarcalistas. (shrink)

Desde un esquema epistemológico sujeto-sujeto y desde un planteo feminista decolonial, nos acercará narrativas de mujeres mapuce que versan sobre la precarización de sus vidas y salud como parte de las violencias instituidas por la cultura hegemónica, poniendo sobre relieve la resiliencia de las culturas subalternizadas a partir de la lucha y re-existencia de estas mujeres.

Gorgias’ On Not-Being survives only in two divergent summaries. Diels–Kranz's classic edition prints the better-preserved version that appears in Sextus’ Aduersus Mathematicos. Yet, in recent years there has been rising interest in a second summary that survives as part of the anonymous De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia. The text of MXG is more difficult; it contains substantial lacunae that often make it much harder to make grammatical let alone philosophical sense of. As Alexander Mourelatos reports, one manuscript has a scribal note (...) that reads: "The original contains many errors; no one should blame me; I just copy what I see.". The treatise's state of preservation has aptly prompted Michael Gagarin to liken it to a black hole: "something we cannot see directly but know must exist because of certain effects it has on other objects.". (shrink)

En "Sobre un presunto derecho a mentir por filantropía", Kant expone el deber incondicionado de veracidad, que ha sido problemático para la filosofía kantiana porque parece obligar a las personas a ser veraces en todas sus declaraciones, sin importar si son comunicaciones públicas o privadas. Llamaré extensiva a la interpretación que sostiene la obligación de ser veraces en todas las declaraciones y mostraré que es causa de inconsistencias con la Doctrina del Derecho. Las inconsistencias se resuelven con una interpretación restrictiva (...) de este deber: la obligación de veracidad es aplicable solo a las comunicaciones públicas. Si mi interpretación es correcta, todas las comunicaciones públicas, ya sean hechas por ciudadanos o funcionarios, tienen la obligación de ser veraces, pero no en las privadas. Mi interpretación es consistente con el resto de los textos donde Kant habla de la comunicación pública. (shrink)

Mellor´s theory of causation has two components, one according to which causes raise their effects´ chances, and one according to which causation links facts. I argue that these two components are not independent from each other and, in particular, that Mellor´s thesis that causation links facts requires his thesis that causes raise their effects´ chances, since without the latter thesis Mellor cannot stop the slingshot argument, an argument that is a threat to any theory postulating facts as the relata of (...) causation. (shrink)

In most domains of human life, we are willing to accept that there are experts with greater knowledge and competencies that distinguish them from non-experts or laypeople. Despite this fact, the very recognition of expertise curiously becomes more controversial in the case of “moral experts”. Do moral experts exist? And, if they indeed do, are there ethical reasons for us to follow their advice? Likewise, can emerging technological developments broaden our very concept of moral expertise? In this article, we begin (...) by arguing that the objections that have tried to deny the existence (and convenience) of moral expertise are unsatisfactory. After that, we show that people have ethical reasons to ask for a piece of moral advice in daily life situations. Then, we argue that some Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems can play an increasing role in human morality by becoming moral experts. Some AI-based moral assistants can qualify as artificial moral experts and we would have good ethical reasons to use them. (shrink)